

Migration, Xenophobia and the Culture of Residual Insecurity in South Africa¹

Peter Vale*

Abstract:

Xenophobia has recently exploded into violence South Africa. This paper – drawn from earlier work – uses critical security studies to tease out the intricate historical and sociological threads that have enabled a country made around the idea of migration to declare a war on new arrivals.

No moment in the life of the new South Africa has been so busy with the techniques of social control, the traps of security and the tropes that construct states than the debate around the movement of people. This suggests the direction of a chapter that follows the tributaries of a series of discourses on migration in post-apartheid South Africa in order to show how the new state has been authored by the security-making techniques of the old. My purpose is to demonstrate how the violent unfoldings of this discourse have constructed the idea that migration to South Africa is a threat. These continuities and the violence which attends them, suggest that received understandings of the state and its security have not changed: indeed, they have been reinforced, notwithstanding the celebration, the fresh beginning, the new start, which was said to accompany the ending of apartheid.

If anything, the new South Africa's encounter with migration – and the ensuing xenophobia this has generated – have sundered the theoretical assumptions that once anchored ideas around the country's exceptionalism². This, has driven discussion on possible futures for the region towards more sophisticated forms of social theory than was previously thought possible, even necessary. So, because migration has opened “an opportunity to examine how boundaries that separate inside from outside get constructed”, this chapter uses, as we will soon see, a range of approaches drawn from critical literature.³ To follow this trajectory, however, will require an informed socio-historical narrative that interrogates the continuing domination of neo-Realist theory in the affairs of the region.

Because orthodox security debates in Southern Africa and elsewhere insist on the holding power of boundary-lines, the issue of migration can only be addressed in a specific way – migrants are always and forever aliens, outsiders, unwashed. Put in a language more familiar to International Relations, orthodox Security Studies insist that boundary lines grant sovereign privilege in order to draw a structural distinction between migrant and resident. Critical literature sees a different triangle between citizen and border and migrant. The issue of whether migration should be, or indeed is, a “security” question is set by the intensity of a policing process – in theoretical terms, this means the structure of language or the routines of security discourse; in practice, this means placing armies and erecting electric fences⁴ along, essentially, the same boundaries. The critical project sees efforts to control and police both national boundaries and intellectual discourses as serving particular interests and seeks to uncover these practices by simply asking, who benefits?

* Nelson Mandela Professor of Politics, Rhodes University, South Africa and Professor in the Department of Politics & International Relations, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia.

A close reading of the chapter will reveal a progression of ancillary goals and some methodological innovations. The first highlights the violence of the discourse in order to recall the far too many instances of sheer cruelty against migrants to South Africa⁵. Much of this brutality is reminiscent of the worst excesses of apartheid, as the following story relates:

“In September 1998, three migrants to South Africa were savaged by a mob on a train: one, a Mozambican, was thrown out while the other two, both Senegalese citizens, were electrocuted as they climbed on the roof trying to escape the crowd. This violence was visited by members of a crowd who were returning from a rally in the country’s administrative capital, Pretoria, who had gathered to protest under the banner of an organisation called “Unemployed Masses of South Africa” who claimed to represent 32 000 jobless people.”⁶

But there are others, too. In October 1998, eighteen people suffocated to death in an unventilated transport container that was smuggling them across the border between Zimbabwe and Botswana. Their destination? South Africa. The cost of the fare? R200.00⁷. But these risks are not all they face. In the same month, the South African press reported that “another Mozambican immigrant” had been killed and eaten by wild animals while crossing the border between Mozambique and South Africa⁸.

To the second of the ancillary goals: it was Hannah Arendt who raised the possibility that banality and evil are twins -- that the most horrendous crimes can be located in a “deficit of thought”⁹, “a specific quality of mind and character”¹⁰. For the purposes of this chapter consider this simple question: Why have South Africa’s rainbow people fashioned a xenophobic nation? As we seek an answer, it will be plain that names have been named. Let me be clear about the purpose of this technique: my objective is not to point fingers at individuals or, indeed, at institutions but rather to point out how -- again, on the level of the banal --- migration towards South Africa’s miracle has come to be seen as both threatening and hostile and why the policy responses are so redolent with the discourse of control¹¹. The third ancillary goal is interested in the relationship between migration and the construction of national identity. The place we continuously call South Africa is the product of an endless process of migration. Viewed reciprocally, the simple truth is this: without the movement of people to the space we call South Africa, there would, quite simply, be no state, no South Africa and, to raise a paradox to which we will often return, no place to which migrants migrated.

The discursive direction of this critical argument suggests that migration is ceaselessly used to stabilize national identity¹² and settle contestations around state security. This contrasts, markedly, with mainstream International Relations that teaches that borders are fixed, durable and inflexible.. In Southern Africa, critical scholarship shows that the search for security is innovative and pregnant with the possibilities provided by human agency by suggesting that national boundaries are unstable, transient and flexible -- or, quite frankly, that they don’t matter at all!¹³ As a result of the insight this promises leads to methodological innovation: I will frequently cross established disciplinary boundaries using different optics to look at the region’s history. As a result of this repertoire of approaches, readers of this chapter who are informed about Southern Africa will discover that a quite familiar world is kneaded in an entirely different fashion, while critical readers might discover familiar themes and techniques applied to what is, perhaps, an unfamiliar condition.

But the business of international relations is also with the business of policy-making, and we must say something on this subject. We have already noted that the question of migration has been a difficult one for the new South Africa. Notwithstanding the promise of new beginnings, this issue, more than many others, confirms the holding power of one particular rendition of history, national history, especially in troubled

times. As Walter Benjamin suggested: “To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it ‘the way it really was’. It means to seize hold of memory as it flashes up in a moment of danger”¹⁴ This power, the force of national memory and privileged recollections of political events limits, rather than opens, the range for policy-making. . Exploring this enables us to identify the many silences that exist between the seeming bustle of policy and social theory.

Picking-up Bad Habits

The notion that South Africa lives up against, rather than with, its neighbours¹⁵ is a recurring theme of my work. This was located within the discourses that lead to state formation in Southern Africa that set South Africa apart and above its neighbours. The debates over migration in South Africa, if anything, have reinforced this routine patterning of inter-state relations in Southern Africa. On the issue of migration, however, there is much more. Seen from the neighbourhood, South Africa is an aggressive state -- particularly to migrants. The derogatory term, amaKwerekwere, used to describe migrants to the country is interpreted as a signal of danger, a deep threat to their personal and community security¹⁶. To understand how this has happened, we must turn to the power of discourse.

In the early 1990s, the movement of peoples generated renewed interest in International Relations. Much of this work focused on policy: the immediate task of managing the movement of people across international borders, especially in Europe following the Kurdish Crisis. The ascendancy of policy discourses in the north reopened a near-dormant engagement with migration as an issue elsewhere – including the rediscovery of localized migration as an interstate issue in both Asia and Africa¹⁷. Then, the horrendous events in the Great Lakes in 1994, drawing on another round of Afro-pessimism and feeding on the growing literature on state failure, focused international attention on possible configurations that the mass movement of people could take on the African continent.

This migration of the issue, as it were -- from local issue, to international item and, then, to security threat. This is exemplified in the following quotation from Myron Weiner:

Migration and refugee issues, no longer the sole concern of ministries of labour or of migration, are now matters of high international politics, engaging the attention of heads of states, cabinets, and key ministries involved in defence, internal security, and external relations.¹⁸

By using the license offered by neo-Realism, cross-border migration was drawn away from the domestic to the international, re-settling it as an issue of what foreign policy analysis call “high politics”. This formulation was to travel well. In South Africa, Myron Weiner’s work, both the *International Security* article and the book¹⁹ that followed, were quickly drawn into reinforcing a series of foundational assumptions about the movement of people towards the country.²⁰

The hegemony of this position was amplified by the support it received from other quarters. So, the idea of migration-as-security threat perspective was echoed by the Harvard political scientist, Samuel P. Huntington, who in another establishment journal, *Foreign Affairs*²¹, argued that the failure to control America’s borders was the single greatest item in the security of the United States. I have singled out Huntington because he has a loyal following in South Africa, especially in traditionally conservative circles. In 1981, for instance, he delivered a talk to the country’s political scientists suggesting ways

in which apartheid might be reformed²²: the paper was often used to justify efforts at reform by the then minority government. And in 1997, following the publication of the book *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*²³, he received an honorary degree from the Rand Afrikaans University.

Huntington's ideas are drawn from the multicultural debate in the United States - a debate that was urged on by the establishment liberal historian Arthur Schlesinger in his 1992 polemic, *The Disuniting of America*²⁴. While the epochal end-of-era writing of the Yale historian, Paul Kennedy²⁵, essentially drew from the same intellectual well both to explain areas of global change and sound warnings over the cross-border movement of people. In the United States, fears over multiculturalism were translated into strong policy-initiatives: most dramatically, these were reflected in the 1994 "war on immigrants" which was integral to the House Republicans infamous "Contract with America"²⁶. In Europe, a parallel response to this disciplining of diasporas, to coin a phrase, was to be known by the metaphor "Fortress Europe".

As South African responses to the intensity of the debate deepened, local academics were also drawn to a parallel argument that was being advanced by the Third World School of Security Studies. This suggested that the primary security concern of Third World polities were threats to the legitimacy of states²⁷. Policy responses to this literature followed, the pattern pre-determined by neo-Realism however, rather than embracing the more nuanced Subaltern Realism advanced by more reflexive Third World security theorists like Mohammed Ayoob²⁸, on two pivotal issues.

First, the government early invoked the idea of the "national interest"²⁹ to promote its new policies: this assertion of government-directed control was far stronger than similar claims had been under apartheid when, indeed, the legitimacy of the state was continually under threat. As other states, the argument ran, South Africa would exercise its policy options when it was in the national interest - migration to South Africa was not to be exempt. Secondly, policy responses were said to derive from an international system that was forged on power considerations alone.³⁰ South Africa was relatively speaking developed and powerful, especially in Southern Africa, therefore, it was positioned to stake out an assertive position on cross-border movement in the region³¹. Importantly for what will follow, both these positions were openly contemptuous of morality and history: the former was seen as "misdirected" and the latter dismissed for having no borders, no limitations, and contra-Hegel no ending.³² These theoretical assumptions became the commanding perspective of South Africa's government, especially the Ministry of Home Affairs, and its coterie of policy advisors, many, but not all, who were drawn from the ranks of South Africa's past³³.

This elevation of migration to high politics drew South Africa's new government far closer to the boundedness of Realist interpretations of the social, than they had signaled while in exile, or whilst in electoral opposition immediately prior to the first democratic election³⁴.

Our immediate interest is not with these policy outcomes, but with the discourse that informed them. Certainly South Africa's policy-makers drew their power from the deepening public disquiet, especially in the press³⁵, over the influx of foreign Blacks into the country but their organic power, as Gramsci might have put it, rested on the hegemonic authority of constructions of danger and the link between these and the search for national identity. Not a little anger and fury were added to the public perception of the migration issue, and determination of policy-makers to do the proverbial something; by the fact that those involved in policy debates were "prone to hyperbole and exaggeration".³⁶ Taken as both theory and method, however, it is difficult

to disagree with the verdict of the geographer Jonathan Crush that the academic approach to the issue amounted to “pseudo-science”³⁷.

In this world, as in the security discourse of the old South Africa, surveillance³⁸ and control became the over-riding policy consideration as surveillance, rather than the understandings that might be offered by alternative explanations. Given this, the solutions initially offered to the ‘problem’ of cross-border movement of people to post-apartheid South Africa were settled within the disciplining boundaries affirmed by the principle of state sovereignty, notwithstanding a rhetorical understanding (to use a striking phrase from Francis Wilson) that migration had made the region. South Africa’s government, through the responsible minister, asserted that both refugees and migrants were considered to be a “problem”³⁹. There was a muted concession to this position from the then Deputy President, Thabo Mbeki --- destined, as we have already seen, to be South Africa’s second democratically elected President. Speaking at a meeting of church leaders, he reminded South Africans of the hospitality that had been shown them by other countries during their own years in exile, and urged a regional solution to the problem.⁴⁰

Pretoria’s Hobbesians

The policy analyst, Maxine Reitzes (in collaboration with Chris Landsberg) had the early insight to call these practitioners of this pseudo-science, “South Africa’s Hobbesians”: a good term considering that no new policy options were forthcoming from a government which continued to rely dated relics from apartheid’s gory days, to police migrants. Long considered the most vicious of apartheid legislation, it was concerned with keeping races separated, in keeping especially Blacks out of White areas and in policing the movement and whereabouts of Blacks. In short, these were policies “designed to control the movement, settlement and location of Black people throughout the South African space economy”⁴¹.

But, there was no incentive to change because nothing had prepared the country for the public response to the cross-border movement of people. The sheer emotion, not to mention the powerful role of the press in making migration a public issue, were inexorably linked to the processes of change. If anything, it described a constitutive relationship between the idea of common nationality and the constructed threat of migration to the country. This conjuncture was caught in a banner headline that appeared on the front-page of *The Argus*⁴², a Cape Town-based afternoon newspaper. Under this screaming 108 point headline, “**Alien ‘Invasion’**”, the paper reported that South Africa had recently deported “132 000 illegals -- 80 000 back to Mozambique”. But placed immediately above the loudness of the headline message, in a red-strap, were these eight words “Your New South Africa Map is Inside Today”. The sensationalized threat of the alien was the price that South Africa was seemingly paying for its new cartography, and its new nationhood.

As this sense of crisis deepened, the policy community seemed to act against the backdrop of sheer emotion --- more properly called xenophobia -- amongst many, if not all of South Africa’s publics. The “othering” of migrants was linked to feelings of superiority derived from the sense of economic development that had been built on apartheid and inflated by the success of South Africa’s transition; ironically, however, it constructed another underclass around the same conceptual primitives upon which apartheid had once rested.

Again in retrospect, this was not surprising. At the time, a narrative of nationhood was directed towards consolidation of a common South Africaness of under the signifier provided by the idea of the “Rainbow Nation”, the trope first articulated by the Nobel Laureate, Desmond Tutu. In its very essence, therefore, the new South African position on migration was, unlike the American experience, accepting of the desirability of multiculturalism but was, like the American experience, deeply antagonistic of migration. What was perhaps unexpected was how quickly the debate took on a vituperative form which, all too often for coincidence, was riddled with connotations of race⁴³ and reminiscent of the country’s unhappy past. Presently, we will uncover the roots of these racial codes, but first I turn to constructions of the security threat posed by migration to South Africa.

The first of these was linked to neo-liberal economics. Population movements from poor to rich countries constitute an economic threat by squeezing the middle-class in more prosperous societies: this, it is argued, is not conducive to the success of market-driven democracies⁴⁴. So, migration to South Africa was constructed as an economic threat to the prosperity of the country’s people along this causal chain: by diluting the human capital stock, migration would weaken the country’s economic potential and, in so doing lay further burdens on a country already struggling to overcome the inequalities of apartheid⁴⁵. If this economic argument was rooted in particular understandings of the power of liberal economics, other debates were more banal.

In a second construction, politicians and the available pool of security state-makers pointed towards threats that seemed or could easily be constructed. So, for instance, the proliferation of drugs⁴⁶ in the sub-continent was linked to the cross-border movement of people. All too quickly, other links were drawn between population flows and concerns in other fields of public policy, like health -- the linkage between migration and the HIV/AIDS pandemic readily suggested itself⁴⁷ and indicates how easily health discourses are recruited into the security field. The literary critic, Ingrid de Kok, caught this when she remarked how ‘(e)lements of the hygiene discourse underpinned by arguments for stability and law and order persist in planning documents, newspaper commentaries and local debates even’ in the new South Africa⁴⁸.

The naturalization of these discourses and “threats” that came to be constructed, were easily accomplished through the power of public discourse on nationalism, on the imperative of neo-liberal economics, on the strengthening borders: to mention only three of many, and of the recourse to the totalizing appeal of population movement as an issue of high politics. Building on the idea of the rainbow nation, the “New South Africa” signifies a new, a cleansed beginning for the country’s people. But the celebration shows, as we have already seen, a darker side – the constructed face of national identity, the harbinger of a nationalism used for the purpose of privileging.

The power of these constructions and the threat they came to pose suggest how effortlessly the debate was drawn towards policy closure. Once again, however, we reach ahead of ourselves, running the now familiar path much loved by those who have so easily made migration into a “massive problem”⁴⁹, as a leading policy pundit was quick to describe the migration after attending, apparently, a single round-table on “order [and] security”. To appreciate the complexities of the issue, we must turn where few of South Africa’s Hobbesians have dared to venture, we must look to history.

History, Migration and the new South Africa

The possibility that the end of apartheid would lead to a significant movement of people from the continent to South Africa was predicted before that system's formal ending. In the late 1980s, as activists and intellectuals worked to weaken and divide the apartheid government, the migration issue entered the discourse of political change and transformation at the margins.⁵⁰ However, following F.W. de Klerk's speech on February 2, 1990, which set the course for the country's move towards democracy, possible migration to the country was increasingly drawn to the forefront of public debate.

So, for instance, a keynote address delivered to the Biennial Conference of the then Development Society of South Africa, noted:

All the evidence suggests that the ending of apartheid will deepen, not weaken, South Africa's attractiveness to the people of the region. This means that when southern Africa's own Berlin Wall – apartheid – finally comes down, a tide of humanity will cross over into this country. To avoid the resulting long-term social dislocation, planning for these migrants needs to commence as soon as possible.⁵¹

But the innocence, not to mention naiveté, of these early signals, and pleas for both sensible and humane policy and its planning, were swept away in the desperate pattern of politics and, later, violence which attended South Africa's transition.

The academic community offered early, crude explanations and provided tentative mappings of the initial course of migration and its effect on inter-state relations in Southern Africa.⁵² These were largely in vain; the power of neo-Realism, swept away not only the best of intentions but also hopes for better policy-making. Like most things in the world of the social, however, setbacks are seldom-simple binaries. Security-minded policy-makers have had to face a painful truth: their efforts both to restrict the cross-border flow of people and to more deeply securitize migration has reinforced "one of the greatest paradoxes about the contemporary practice of sovereignty: even as states are increasing their efforts to control their borders, they, [lose].. ground".⁵³

Aletta Norval has demonstrated the constructions of identity, and the link between identity and nationality, which were central to the socio-historical narrative that first created and, later, secured the apartheid state⁵⁴. Appreciating this work takes us closer to viewing migration through a political-historical⁵⁵ lens. Her approach momentarily places the movement of people as the dominant storyline in the construction of the old South Africa -- a White-ruled European state in Southern Africa; a state successively aligned to Holland and Britain (but later to other European countries) in a series of "long and special historical relationships".⁵⁶ No small part of this link was the role of signifiers: Britain as "home" for South Africa's English speakers, and The Netherlands as "die stamland"* for Afrikaners.

We must pause here to lay down, in a hurried paragraph, an ontological marker that was initially raised in the first chapter. The political shape of Southern Africa -- its division into states-as-means-to-community dominated by one of their number, South Africa -- is, for our immediate purposes, the central concern. There are, of course, many other Southern Africas -- a regional ontology sketched by the notion of a Southern Africa of people, for instance, is centrally juxtaposed, against the region of states, in the book from which this paper is drawn. For now, however, identifying and naming these *Other*

* Tribal land

Southern Africas, these alternative futures, lies beyond our immediate interest. Appreciating this helps explain the special relationship to which we have just referred, and to which we now will return.

What were also “special” in the relationships between South Africa and Holland and European states were, of course, the power of naming, the discourse of racial exclusivity and the role of money. Let us be clear about these. The political form of Southern Africa -- its division into states -- was the product of Western imaginings supported by agents of the local. The power to name and carve out South Africa as a distinctive space was, as Black scholars have ceaselessly mentioned⁵⁷, an act of great violence and force. It was patently linked to understandings of race superiority and spurred forward by the irresistible arguments of the purse that the discovery of diamonds and gold promised to first deliver to “home” and , later a construction called Empire that served to secure the same “home”.

Taken together, the power of naming, notions of racial superiority and concentrations of power set both the theory and practice of the debate on security in South Africa for close on three centuries. The old South Africa enjoyed far more potent links -- political, cultural and economic -- with these northern places than it did with the state structures that came to surround it, and that were drawn to become Larry Bowman’s “subordinate state sub-system of Southern Africa”⁵⁸, a construct of place we have already encountered. The energy spent in these special relationships was also geared toward drawing migrants to the country to reinforce a particular form of national identity and to allay the security fears of the settler minority.

In the construction of the South African state, then, migration has always been a source of security, not a cause for insecurity. The great mass of this migration occurred during the nineteenth century export of Europeans all over the globe! And at the same historical moment when notions of military strategy, upon which the discipline of Security Studies was to build, were first codified⁵⁹. This, and decision-making about technical development especially in the military field, was centralized and was guarded from public scrutiny and debate.⁶⁰ Given the link to security, migration to South Africa was always carefully controlled by Empire and successive minority governments to service narrow ideological ends.⁶¹

Because the debate on migration to the new South Africa has played out in such fundamental – indeed, brutal – terms and because the discourse on race has hovered closely by, it is necessary to insert another factual point. The migration of Whites to South Africa continued until the very ending of the apartheid system, although under a series of changing incentives. Consider, for instance, this report on immigration to the country set out in *The Official Yearbook of the Union of South Africa*: “From 1924 onwards, immigrants from countries situated in eastern, central and southern Europe arrive in increasing numbers each year.”⁶²

My purpose in inserting a neglected historical-political storyline in the contemporary migration issue is remedial, not palliative. The proliferation of policy advice proffered on the movement of people to the new South Africa, particularly the determined efforts of selected writers to reinforce the link between migration and security has strongly paralleled right-wing thinking on this issue in, especially, the United States and Europe. Anthony Messina has noted that this latter work has given little attention to uncovering the historical roots of immigration policy⁶³ nor, for that matter, has it been paid to the role played by migration in the making of states. Recognising this draws the narrative forward to the link between migration and the early making of the South African state.

Deep within the founding myths of White power in South Africa, stand the huddled image of some 180 French Huguenots who settled in the Cape Colony in the late 1680s and the early 1690s. The celebration of their role as distinctive force in the early sedimentation of the place which was to be called South Africa, and their contribution to the development Calvinism in the region, was central in the construction of Afrikaner (and later White) identity in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries. In more recent times, the role of the Huguenots as the genius behind South Africa's internationally competitive viticulture continues the celebration of their position in the making of South Africa in this, the globalising world of the Twenty-First Century. Stripped of this myth-making, however, the Huguenots were little more than outsiders seeking a new beginning a new inside.

The importance of the Huguenots in the present discussion, however, lies beyond the largely symbolic role they played in the building of the White state, and the European sophistication that they were said to have brought to distant South Africa. It lies in the findings of recent scholarship. Confirming Orwell's dictum that those who control the past, control the future, this work shows that the French Huguenots present a distinct moment in the unfolding narrative in the processes of state formation. In a compelling study, on refugees and the displacement practices of statecraft, Nevzat Soguk argues that the flight of Protestants from France under Louis XIV was "something that happened in the course of statecraft". The revocation of the Edict of Nantes was initiated by the French-state-in-formation, and the flight of the Huguenots "manifested the difficulties of statecraft...[because these events effectively]...escaped the control of statecraft." But the resulting homogenization of the country, through religion, set the scene for French "proto-nationalism". "In all, the Huguenot displacement was part and parcel of a larger shift in practices of government by which the absolute state would begin to acquire the characteristics of a modern centralizing state"⁶⁴.

This difficult situation was seemingly well appreciated by the Dutch East India Company that then controlled the Cape to which South Africa's Huguenots were carried. Rodney Davenport notes how quickly and purposefully, they were encouraged to integrate into mainstream agrarian life – at a place called Franschoek near the current university town of Stellenbosch --of the Cape.⁶⁵ It was this very construct, the Cape that would eventually be drawn forward in order to make the South African state. This event was "one of the earlier in a series of events that, from the seventeenth century to the twentieth century, firmly established both in imagination and in practice, the notion of statist territoriality, in the territorial boundedness of life as the single most significant defining property in the existence of communities"⁶⁶.

The French Huguenots became the icon that represented migration of Europeans to South Africa; a bridge to Europe signifying the country's modernity, or as its White leaders used to say, its development. During the Cold War, both were powerful arguments in assessments of South Africa's strategic importance to the West. The link to Europe appeared as the central discourse in the country's formal politics for close on three centuries. So, the once vociferous exchange between South Africa's two White communities -- one Afrikaans-speaking, one English-speaking were almost entirely grounded in the political conversations, both domestic and international, of 19th Century Europe. Using Foucault to inform her gaze, Kate Manzo confirms, "[m]ajor struggles during the colonial era (ie prior to 1945) in South Africa involved Dutch settlers in their relations with colonial administrators (both Dutch and British), with European capitalists, and with missionary and antislavery societies".⁶⁷

Indeed, within a series of sequential political tussles between South Africa's White communities, and in conflicts between Black and White, the issue of population movement was often pivotal in tipping the balance, strategic and other. In the early 1820s, for example, special immigration schemes brought some 4000 Settlers from various parts of Britain, mainly from England, to the Eastern Cape. Their influence on the life of the country has been profound: it was they that helped to consolidate the language of administration, of Empire, into the language of the new South Africa. Between 1860 and 1911 Indian indentured laborers arrived in South Africa: estimates suggest that there were more than 150 000 of them. Their presence greatly enriched almost every aspect of South African life, including its current politics. Numbered amongst those who came to the country to help defend their rights was Mohandas Gandhi who lived in Natal between 1893 and 1914.⁶⁸ The Chinese also came to South Africa as indentured labour: some 63 000 of them on three-year contracts to work in the gold mines. While most returned home, a few remained to be joined, in more recent years, by numbers of Chinese from Taiwan, in particular⁶⁹.

Perhaps the most significant moment in which the movement of people was directly inserted into the politics of the country is also the most over-researched, but least understood. This was the sharp deterioration in relationship between South Africa's two White communities over the appellation "Uitlander"¹ which was applied to non-Afrikaner Whites that had settled on the Witwatersrand ore reef following the discovery of gold in 1886. Their political recalcitrance, their greed and their undoubtedly duplicity – essentially an unwillingness to countenance Afrikaner understandings of sovereignty --led to the infamous Jameson Raid of January 1896⁷⁰ which led to the South African War of 1899-1902.

Significant? Why?

By drawing forward the Cape Colony and joining it to a fledgling state called the Transvaal Republic, the peace which ended that war provided the founding moment of the state we still call South Africa. The formal boundaries of the South African state were decided at the same moment and, it was upon these borders and understandings of sovereignty, that other states in the region came to be formed. This political structure has endured for more than a hundred years – longer than any others in the history of modern South Africa.

The catalyst for this cataclysmic event was the right of migrants to participate in the formal politics of the country: in particular, voting rights for Uitlanders in the Transvaal Republic. On this interpretation, and if the longevity of political institutions are a test of strength for structuralists, the policy responses to migration, offer great lessons to be drawn from South Africa's history.

Because this is so, and because the narrative on migration to the new South Africa is so manifestly emptied of history, it seems opportune to briefly recall the more common reasons for the movement of people during the Nineteenth Century. Consider these: overpopulation and destitution in certain parts of Europe, Ireland, Scotland and Southern Italy; the disorganization of traditionally accepted economies and the widening of a capitalist base following the Industrial Revolution and the flourishing of, particularly, British Imperialism; and, of course, political and religious fallout – especially, minorities, both ethnic and religious.⁷¹ Suitably adjusted for the

¹ Literally "Belonging to the Outer lands" but more commonly translated as foreigner.

considerations of time and space, each of these might apply to the question of migration to post-apartheid South Africa.

A further lesson from the same rendition of history is instructive. In the simple-minded application of Myron Weiner's ideas to local conditions, South African pundits incessantly draw attention to two linked ideas: "to anti-foreigner sentiments (sic) [that] can have an adverse impact on domestic political stability"⁷², and, secondly, to the role that migrants could play in fostering the political interests of foreign powers within South African sovereignty⁷³. Again adjusted for time and space, President Paul Kruger of the Transvaal Republic, must surely have been exposed to the same enclosing discourses of sovereignty, threat and state survival in the late-Victorian era. If, as some are wont to suggest, migrants to South Africa are symptoms of the phenomenon that contemporary conversations call globalization, Kruger's advisors may well have warned him that the Uitlanders who, as he is once said to have famously proclaimed "have come for our country", were symptoms of an earlier form of (what we now call) globalization: Imperialism.

Countless writers⁷⁴ suggest that the presence of the Uitlanders reinforced Afrikaner identity, strengthening their affinity for the soil, for national sovereignty and reinforcing the many ideas that were eventually to lead to Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid. As conditioning factors to group behavior, these myths certainly made it difficult to dislodge successive Afrikaner leaders.

Interesting though it unquestionably would be, my objective here is not to set out further archaeology on this dimension of migration to South Africa, nor, in this place, do I want to further pursue the issue of the relationship between South Africa's two White minorities. My purpose in using this methodology has been to establish that migration to the country and the contestations between two White groups, one loosely described as Dutch and the other, British, were central in the discourse that constructed the White state and its understandings of security. The wider point suggests the contingency of the idea of sovereignty in Southern Africa which constructed statehood based on migration.

Migrancy in the making of South African power

We must finally turn to the movement of people and economic growth in Southern Africa. This commenced with the discovery of minerals. Comparative prosperity neither in South Africa, nor in the region, would have followed had it not been for the migration of cheap labour.

The central economic debate in the making of modern Southern Africa has been between two contesting schools: Revisionist⁷⁵ and Liberal⁷⁶. In the 1970s and 1980s, this contest proved to be the battle for the ideological soul of South Africa. Obviously, the Cold War setting in which this contestation took place accentuated the differences between the two positions and much inflated the claims of the protagonists. But divided and antagonistic though the two positions were, the one issue on which both could agree was that the South African economy was primarily built on cheap labour, most of which was migrant and much of it was sourced from beyond South Africa's borders.

Migration of people in the region is not new. According to Jonathan Crush Migration to South Africa from the region dates back more than 150 years. Indeed, long-distance migration for employment pre-dates the drawing of international borders by the colonial powers in the latter half of the nineteenth century.⁷⁷

And the economic historian Francis Wilson reinforces the argument by pointing to the constitutive role of labour migration in the formation of a Southern Africa of states.

One definition of the fourteen-country membership of the Southern African Development Community is that, apart from Mauritius, the Seychelles and the Democratic Republic of Congo, all the countries at one time or another provided labour (sic) to the [South African] gold mines.⁷⁸

The catalytic role of migration, especially labour migration, in the generation of Southern African wealth contradicted that “great fiction of world politics, which has guided the actions of poets, priests, peasants and patriots since the nineteenth century, namely, that nations have the right, if not the destiny, to rule themselves, in their own nation-state, on their own territory”⁷⁹.

In Southern Africa, but elsewhere on the continent, too, this fiction is largely manifested by the structural requirements of what some call a “regional economy”. A range of instruments that have facilitated the cross-border movement of people, however, has assisted the building of a trans-regional economy in which South Africa is both beneficiary and facilitator. So, South African mining houses established a centralized recruiting agency, the Native Recruiting Agency called WNLA (the Witwatersrand Native Labour Agency) to regulate the flow of migrant workers into the country’s mines. This arrangement has enjoyed a special place in the affairs of Southern Africa: a place beyond the normal trappings of sovereignty. Operating through a series of bilateral labour agreements between South Africa and select states, South Africa’s mines have pursued what Crush helpfully calls their own “foreign policy”⁸⁰. The object of this policy was to ensure that migrant labour remained a commodity – easily managed, contained and always at hand. Under this arrangement, migrant workers had to leave South Africa every year after 11 months and reapply for employment from their home countries. Moreover, their accommodation on the mines was provided by the mining industry, minimizing both the responsibility of South Africa’s government for their welfare and also reducing the possibility of them filtering into the country’s growing townships and so remaining permanently in the country. The migrant labour system built up the economy and helped the apartheid government maintain its racial exclusion policy. So, ironically, while the migrant labour system seemed to violate orthodox interpretations of South Africa’s sovereignty, it was in practice an important component of it⁸¹.

These migrant labour flows, with few and very particular exceptions⁸², have continued throughout the course of political quarrels and constitutional change. And, notwithstanding the fury of the discourse that has accompanied the flow of other migrants to the new South Africa, this dimension has not been subjected to public scrutiny or the machinations of a new generation of security-state makers. As a result, the new South Africa, like the old, has operated two migration gates -- one on labour migration, which has been open, and another for other forms of migration, which has remained, officially closed.

Continuous violations of sovereignty have been permitted in the pursuit of economic growth. These dispensations, for they are dispensed by power and ultimately serve wealth alone, are not unique to Southern Africa. As Michael Shapiro, has pointed out, states “have kept ‘foreign populations’ at a distance conceptually, [but]... other practices of industrially and economically advanced states have produced flows of such people across state boundaries”.⁸³

The centrality of migrant labour in the making of Southern Africa has been a core focus of the revisionist school of regional historiography⁸⁴; as a result, core discussions about processes of political change and, understandably, wealth distribution in both South and southern Africa have been driven by theoretically informed understandings of political economy⁸⁵. These have sought to emphasize the mutually supportive relations, almost clientelist relations, between organized business interests, especially mining, and state power in South Africa, explaining the region's state system through the optic offered by political economy.

The compulsion of labour to migrate, as we might call it, in Southern Africa remains located in the folds of the historical bargain that, in pursuit of growth and accumulation, has thwarted the border processes routinely required by the region's geopolitics. Its effect has been profound: southern Africa's people have continuously serviced South Africa's growing wealth and its assertion of political and strategic hegemony over the states that have been constructed around it.

Writing migration as neo-apartheid.

To mark migrant labour as a social category is to use the two migration gates, which we have already noted, as a basis for taxonomy. If the region's mining economy required low-paid workers, these were recruited from the rural areas of both South and southern Africa. But the process of recruiting from the regional periphery -- to use a metaphor from International Political Economy -- to work at the region's core, was not restricted to the mining sector alone.

As South Africa's wealth grew, more and more migrants were drawn into a moneyed economy. This quest for modernity in the region greatly ruptured traditional life patterns, as Ruth First noted. Indeed, most peasant households throughout southern Africa were wholly dependent on remittances from migrant labour: as a result, the migrant labour system has fashioned every economic sector in Southern Africa for more than a century⁸⁶. Within apartheid South Africa, this process was eventually known by the spatial euphemism "urbanization"; in policy terms, particularly in South Africa itself, urbanization was witness, through the policy instrument known as Influx Control, to some of the bitterest forms of minority violence. As this chapter draws towards a close, we must spend some time considering both the language and the long-term fruit of these policies.

Let me immediately say again why it is that we are revisiting this manifestation of the unhappy past. My technique in this paper is to insert into the current debates, a sense of a different past than those too readily celebrated by mainstream narratives. The argument suggests, amnesia – or rather remembering a certain, often distorted version of the past -- has been an essential tool in the making of the new South Africa. But the practice of an amnesia that celebrates the ever present opens, as Jürgen Habermas has warned, the space for corrosion of social purpose, for a failure to accept moral responsibility for the past. This has happened in South Africa on many occasions and it continues with the issue of migration.

As policy-makers and the policy-community have searched for mechanisms to control the flow of migrants to the country they have, as both Reitzes and Crush have suggested, looked backwards to Influx Control -- a mechanism of surveillance that stood at the core of apartheid. Caught in a maze of complex legislation, the policy aimed to keep Blacks from entering the privileged world of White South Africa, except in particular circumstances. It rested on a series of utilitarian arguments caught in the

words of a government commission, in 1922, which recommended that “natives should only be allowed to enter the urban areas to minister to the needs of the White man and should depart there from when he ceases so to minister.”⁸⁷

If, after violence, complex legislation was the core of social control in apartheid South Africa, Influx Control was the true measure of the success or failure of the ideology. Its most notorious legal manifestation was the 1952 “Section 10 Legislation” that denied the right to live in an urban area of any African who was not born there, unless they had lived in the area for fourteen years or unless they had worked for the same employer for ten years. The “Section 10 Legislation” reduced to 72 hours (from fourteen days) the time allowed for Blacks to find employment in urban areas.

At the root of these policies -- cased in legal niceties -- were a series of institutional concerns little different from those which, today, have securitized the issue of migration both in the new South Africa and in other parts of the world: fears of the spread of infection – HIV/Aids in particular, the possibility of depressed wages, fear of under-capitalized competition in the market place and the prospect of declining property values⁸⁸. These were at the core of the social concerns which first prompted, and then justified, Influx Control.

It was however in the everyday discourses of policy-makers and politicians that analyzed the social world to be policed that the mechanisms of control were rooted, and in which they remain located. The same disturbing language, the same knots of argument are found, in efforts, of the press, policy analysts and politicians, to approach the issue of population flow into the new South Africa. Because this is so, a discussion on migration to South Africa and the role it has played in the making of the state, this analysis will be incomplete without hearing the distant voices that, in the 1920s and 1930s, drove South Africa’s then policy planners to initiate control over the influx of Blacks to the urban areas. Listening into these conversations seventy years later, Gary Minkley reporting on the ‘problem of native urbanization’ in the South African port city of East London writes of the inscription of “blots on [the] landscape” of White South Africa. “Social scientists, planners and administrators”, he writes,

Variouly identified what was lived and perceived with what was conceived. In the very language of ...investigation and reports, the ‘advance of irregular urbanization’ and the fungus of haphazard planning, insanitary housing, disease and crime’ were associated with the increasingly dominant urban form of ‘pondokkie slum’. Defined in these representations of space, in fact the congested point around which they all cohered, was a body and an identity ‘intimately acquainted with his wilderness’, this ‘evil’, this shapeless ‘fungal growth’: ‘The chief offenders are Natives’.⁸⁹

With deliberate intent, I have traversed the literature that has, for close on three decades, mapped and spoken on the issue of migration – labour and other – to South Africa. The purpose has been not to reinforce the point made by Jonathan Crush that “the history of migration in Southern Africa is one of the most researched and well-documented academic fields in the region.”⁹⁰ Rather, it has been to link this work, this insight to contemporary readings of “threat analysis” to historicize it, so to speak.

The fusion of migration and security in post-apartheid South Africa was inherent in the processes which drew South Africans towards a post-apartheid identity and a policy repertoire which drew on forms of social control associated with the country’s apartheid past But mechanisms of social control also carved out privileged space for South Africa setting the country apart from its neighbours as a distinctive and privileged political entity.

Mainstream writing in International Relations and in Security Studies has failed to map this -- notwithstanding that the resulting sedimentation has determined the course of regional relations, including the ceaseless movement of people for more than a century. This approach to knowing has simply failed to recognize that, “how things develop depends in part on *where* they develop, on what has been historically sedimented there, on the social and spatial structures that are already in place”⁹¹.

So, notwithstanding its obvious relevance to an understanding of southern African affairs, orthodox International Relations and Security Studies in South Africa⁹² have paid scant attention to the question of labour migration to South Africa. Why? For one thing, these were considered a natural part of the regional intercourse and, when they were not, they were explained by the special status of labour migration to South Africa’s mines.

The dominant picture of the region is a world of states, organized through an optic that has purported to provide the order described by Max Weber and the hierarchies offered by Charles Darwin. In this, South Africa was both anchor and guarantor of regional security. Certainly successive western governments, as evidenced in Kissinger’s infamous NSSM 39⁹³ study, took the view that what mattered in Southern Africa was the future of state security and South Africa, a compliant, preferably White-ruled, pro-Western capitalist country. . Mainstream security analysts in South Africa, certainly, followed this lead by northern epistemes. But, as we have suggested here, there was another Southern Africa, a region of people. Migration --- labour and other --- is a manifestation of this world. This was the world, historically speaking, of “low” politics, or the world of “no state” politics in Southern Africa. It did not involve fundamental or key policy issues because, as an infamous paper on migration to South Africa once suggested, they were “ours for our taking”.⁹⁴

The deepening intensity of the real relations between South Africa and its neighbours, the question of labour migration and the resulting debris was, mercifully, left to the work of others: economic historians, sociologists, anthropologists and, in South Africa’s case, historians. Their labour mapped the region’s rich texture and traced many of its hidden pathways, its hidden faces, and its life-world. They have shown benefits aplenty: benefits that have escaped statist eyes. The centuries long ebb and flow of migration to South Africa is deeply embedded in regional lore⁹⁵ – its cultural networks in music⁹⁶, art and literature are integral to the vibrant texture in the life-world of Southern Africa⁹⁷.

Very little, I fear, was transmitted from this towards orthodox Security Studies, partly because the political register of most of this other work was revisionist and therefore inherently critical of a regional sub-system that was dominated by a racist and capitalist state. In the world of Security Studies capitalism in the region was a progressive force, rather than a violating and penetrating one, a force that brought in its wake development, stability, and security. But the other view saw things differently: as Patrick Harries notes in his fine study of Mozambican migration to South Africa’s mines, this mode of enquiry believed that migrant labour, in particular, led to “exploitation and cognitive dislocation”⁹⁸.

This discussion would be incomplete without a return to Hannah Arendt who knew life as refugee, exile and as a citizen of a new country. In her essay, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*⁹⁹, in which she drew in part from the story of Southern Africa that we have just traversed, she argued that the loss of political community, more than any other administrative act, deprived individuals of their security, their humankind. Following her participation in the Zionist cause during and after the Second World War, the

foreclosing processes of Zionist nationalism, upon which the state of Israel was founded, dashed her own hopes for humanity. In Southern Africa, the reassertion of South Africanism appears to have rediscovered techniques of administration and control that, although used in the name of security, are witness to Arendt's "catastrophic decline of the national-state system". But because this state system is built on violence, the horrific treatment of migrants to the new South Africa suggests that any end game will be resisted with much of the same.

¹ This paper is drawn from my book *Security and Politics in South Africa: The Regional Dimension*. (2003) Boulder, Colorado and London. Lynne Rienner Publishers. 250 pp. (also published by the University of Cape Town Press, 2003).

² See Ran Greenstein, "Identity, Race, History: South Africa and the Pan-African Context," in Greenstein ed, *Comparative Perspectives on South Africa*, pp. 1-32.

³ Doty, "Immigration and National Identity," p. 240.

⁴ In 1986, the apartheid government erected a 137km electric fence along South Africa's northern border with Zimbabwe. Eleven years later, South Africa's first post-apartheid Minister of Defence, Joe Modise, threatened to turn on the electric fence separating South Africa and Mozambique onto "lethal" mode to stem the flow of illegal migrants from that country. McDonald ed, *On Borders*, p. 2, Quoting from *The Star*, Johannesburg, 6 May 1997. See also "Talk of Turning Up the Power Again as Illegal Immigrants Flood through the Fence into South Africa," *Sunday Independent*, Johannesburg, 13 August 1995.

⁵ Some of this is not delivered directly by man although certainly it is constructed by the conditions of the only politics that is presently on offer as this small example shows. In June 1998, it was reported that a "pride of lions" had attacked and killed a suspected Mozambican migrant in South Africa's Kruger National Park. In ghoulish fashion, it was reported that game rangers, after rushing to the scene found "only the deceased head and a few ribs". "Lions Kill Illegal Migrant", *The Citizen*, Johannesburg, 3 June 1998.

⁶ "Train from Hell to Irene Station," *The Pretoria News*, 4 September 1998. For a wider description of these kinds of practice See *Prohibited Persons*.

⁷ "Horror Deaths of 18 Illegals," *The Star*, Johannesburg, 23 October 1998; "Death-truck Survivors Tell of Ordeal," *The Star*, Johannesburg, 27 October 1998; "Embassy Slammed over Zim Women's Death," *The Citizen*, Johannesburg, 27 October 1998;

⁷ "Lions, Hyenas Eat Illegal Immigrant," *The Citizen*, Johannesburg, 27 October 1998.

⁹ From the "Editor's Introduction," by Peter Baehr to *The Portable Hannah Arendt*, p. xxv. On the Hannah Arendt and the Eichman issue see Sela Benhabib, "Arendt's Eichman in Jerusalem," in *The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt*, pp. 65-85.

¹⁰ Sela Benhabib, "Arendt's Eichman in Jerusalem," in *The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt*, p. 74.

¹¹ For a discussion of early policy see Kotze and Hill, "Emergent Migration Policy in a Democratic South Africa," p. 5-32.

¹² On this issue, see Ryan Sinclair, "I Know a place that is Softer Than This," pp. 465-481.

¹³ For an example of this see the collection of essays in Spiegel and Mc Allister eds, *Tradition and Transition in Southern Africa*.

¹⁴ Benjamin, *Illuminations*, p. 258.

¹⁵ On this theme, see Peter Vale "Backwaters and Bypasses," in Swatuk and Black eds, *Bridging the Rift*, pp. 71-84.

¹⁶ The trauma of this life in contemporary urban South Africa is described in Mpe, *Welcome to our Hillbrow*.

¹⁷ For a discussion of migration in Africa as a localised issue see van Hear, "Refugees and Displaced People in Africa."

¹⁸ Weiner, "Security, Stability and International Migration," pp. 91-126.

¹⁹ Weiner, *The Global Migration Crisis*.

²⁰ On this see Solomon, "Defending Borders," pp. 9-13.

²¹ Huntington, "The West," pp.28-46

²¹ Huntington, "Reform and Stability in a Modernizing, Multi-ethnic Society," pp. 8-26.

²³ Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*.

²⁴ Schlesinger, *The Disuniting of America*.

²⁵ Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-first Century*.

²⁶ It is certainly true that these were not the only voices on the issue: for example, the liberal academic and journalist, Sanford Ungar, published a book in which he argues that to be American "is being part of an ever more heterogeneous people", and to take part in the constant redefinition of its fabric. See "Mixed Reception," *The Economist*, London, 4 November 1995, p. 109.

²⁷ Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*, pp. 173-175. For a recent South Africa articulation of the same position see Annette Seegers, "The New National Security Doctrine."

²⁸ Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament*.

²⁹ On this issue see Vale and Daniel, "Regional Security in Southern Africa in the 1990s," pp. 84-93.

³⁰ Brettell and Hollifield, *Migration Theory*, p. 154.

³¹ Solomon, *Towards the Free Movement of People in Southern Africa*, p. 2.

³² Solomon, "Defending Borders," p. 10.

³³ In June 1998, The Institute for Strategic Studies at the University of Pretoria arranged a workshop on "border control and protection" under this title "The Illegal Movement of People and Goods: Where is South Africa Heading and how can it be managed?" The only non-South African speaker was the Country Attaché of the United States Department of Justice.

³⁴ On this see Mandela, "South Africa's Future Foreign Policy."

³⁵ On this see Danso and McDonald, *Writing Xenophobia*.

³⁶ Messina, "The Not so Silent Revolution," p. 152.

³⁷ Jonathan Crush, "Migrations Past," in McDonald ed, *On Borders*, p. 22.

³⁸ The surveillance of migrants to the new South Africa, in some cases, been as viciously executed as that used against the apartheid regime. For an insight into these techniques see Minaar and Hough et al., *Who Goes There?* pp. 164-171.

³⁹ Writing on this issue, Marion Ryan Sinclair says:

The migration research that has been conducted within South Africa since the beginning of the decade, and particularly over the past two years, has revolved largely around the discussions of migration as a societal response to state policies and action, explaining migration primarily in terms of national sovereignty and security, as a phenomenon to control, contain and export.

Ryan Sinclair, "Community, Identity and Gender in Migrant Societies of Southern Africa," p. 341.

⁴⁰ "Foreign Influx: Mbeki Takes a Soft Line," *The Cape Times*, Cape Town, 13 October 1994.

⁴¹ Ann Bernstein, "Influx Control in Urban South Africa," in Giliomee and Schlemmer eds, *Up Against the Fences*, p. 85.

⁴² *The Argus*, Cape Town, 2 September 1994. The alien theme was taken up a few years later. See Maharaj and Rajkumar, "The 'Alien Invasion' in South Africa," pp. 255-273.

⁴³ A survey conducted by an NGO-sponsored project on migration to South Africa reported that "anti-foreigner sentiments are more rampant among White than Black South Africans, with more Whites favouring a prohibitionist migration policy". See "Anti-foreigner Feelings 'Run High Among Whites'," *The Star*, Johannesburg, 25 September 1998.

⁴⁴ Quoted in James F. Hollifield, "The Politics of International Migration," in Brettell and Hollifield eds, *Migration Theory*, p. 154.

⁴⁵ On this see Hussein Solomon, "From Accommodation to Control, to Control and Intervention," in Rotberg and Mills eds, *War and Peace in Southern Africa*, pp. 122-148.

⁴⁶ On this issue consider this quote from "Illegal Immigration Getting Worse," *The Citizen*, Johannesburg, 10 January 1996:

problem [of migrants] is far worse than it should be", says [Minister of Home Affairs] Buthelezi. The United States drug enforcement agency head, Thomas Constantine had exchanged views with Buthelezi on border control problems. Several South African government departments would visit the United States to study cross-border drug trafficking and the related problem of illegal immigration. Chief Buthelezi says the US had extensive experience with illegal immigration from Mexico.

⁴⁷ See Schutte, *Migration*, p. 8. See also Venter ed, *Migrancy and Aids*.

⁴⁸ Ingrid de Kok, "Cracked Heirlooms," in Nutall and Coetzee eds, *Negotiating the Past*, p. 70.

⁴⁹ "Border Security: A Major Concern for SA?" *The Cape Times*, Cape Town, 14 December 1994.

⁵⁰ In 1989 it was introduced at a meeting of the then Institute for Democracy in South Africa by the prominent politician, public intellectual and now businessman, Fredrik van Zyl Slabbert.

⁵¹ Peter Vale. "A farewell to Arms?" in Beukes et al, *Development, Employment and the New South Africa*, pp. 3-23.

⁵² See, for example, Vale and Solomon, in "Migration and Global Change," *Migration*, pp. 2-22.

⁵³ Mills, "Permeable Borders," p. 78.

⁵⁴ Norval, *Deconstructing Apartheid Discourse*. For a discussion on the construction of national identity in South Africa see Cross, *Imagery of Identity in South African Education 1880-1990*.

⁵⁵ Messina, "The Not so Silent Revolution," p.141.

⁵⁶ Messina, "The Not so Silent Revolution," p. 142.

⁵⁷ On this issue see Prah, *Beyond the Colour Line*.

⁵⁸ Bowman, "The Subordinate State in Southern Africa," pp. 231-361.

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- ⁵⁹ See Booth and Herring, *Keyguide to Information Resources on Strategic Studies*, pp. 23-26.
- ⁶⁰ Strik, *Critical Theory, Politics and Society*, p. 71.
- ⁶¹ An example of the official approach to the issue see "Immigration and Emigration," in *South Africa 1976*, pp. 289-296.
- ⁶² *Official Year Book of the Union of South Africa and of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland*, p. 1099. Although no details exist for the source of these migrants, it is possible to suggest that many of these were of the Jewish faith that, fearing the persecution which eventually followed, were drawn to the promise of South Africa. The rich texture of South Africa life, and indeed its passage to change, has been marked in significant ways by the contributions of South Africa's Jewish community. On this issue see Lazerson, *Against The Tide*, pp. 82-99.
- ⁶³ Messina, "The Not so Silent Revolution," p. 153.
- ⁶⁴ Soguk, *States and Strangers*, p. 71.
- ⁶⁵ Davenport, *South Africa*, pp. 21-22.
- ⁶⁶ Soguk, *States and Strangers*, p. 72.
- ⁶⁷ Manzo, "Global Power and South African Politics," p. 23.
- ⁶⁸ See Bhana and Brain, *Setting Down Roots*.
- ⁶⁹ See Yap and Man, *Colour, Confusion and Concession*.
- ⁷⁰ On this see, for example, Porter, *The Origins of the South African War*.
- ⁷¹ Drawn from the entry on "Migration" in *The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth Century Social Thought*.
- ⁷² Solomon, "Immigration and Security in South Africa," p. 4.
- ⁷³ These notions of the migrant as the force for disruption of local politics have made many appearances in contemporary times, too. In his powerful analysis of refugees and statecraft, Nevzat Soguk reports this 1993 paragraph from the pen of Polish Columnist, Witold Pawloski.
- Another blow has struck... [generating].... another major problem: of refugees.....All over the world, the problem, of refugees, is a kind of tax levied on democracy and prosperity. Every state avoids the refugees like the plague, even if they travel in escorted carriages.
- Soguk, *States and Dangers*, p. 31.
- ⁷⁴ The best book on these issues the remains, in my view, de Klerk, *The Puritans in Africa*.
- ⁷⁵ There are many examples of this work. See, for instance, Murray, *South African Capitalism and Black Political Opposition*.
- ⁷⁶ For this work see O'Dowd, *South Africa*.
- ⁷⁷ Jonathan Crush, "Migrations Past," in McDonald ed, *On Borders*, pp 12-13.
- ⁷⁸ Wilson, "Minerals and Migrants," p. 104.
- ⁷⁹ Donnan and Wilson, *Border's Frontiers of Identity, Nation and State*, p. 6.
- ⁸⁰ Crush, "Fortress South Africa and the Deconstruction of Apartheid's Migration Regime," p. 5.
- ⁸¹ A happy email exchange with Dr Marion Ryan Sinclair on 25 May 2001, clarified these points.
- ⁸² For a brief summary discussion of these issues see Crush, "Fortress South Africa and the Deconstruction of Apartheid's Migration Regime."
- ⁸³ Shapiro, "Narrating the Nation," p. 6.
- ⁸⁴ The clearest, certainly the most accessible presentation of this is Johnstone, "Most Painful to our Hearts," pp. 5-26.
- ⁸⁵ Here are a few random examples of this work. Wilson, *Labour in the South African Gold Mines, 1911-1969*; Johnstone, *Class, Race and Gold*; Lacey, *Working for Boroko*; Crush, Jeeves and Yudelman, *South Africa's Labour Empire*; James, *Our Precious Metal*.
- ⁸⁶ Deborah Potts, "The Hanging Geography of Southern Africa," in Chapman and Baker eds, *The Changing Geography of Africa and the Middle East*, p. 30.
- ⁸⁷ *Apartheid*, p. 43.
- ⁸⁸ Worden, *The Making of Modern South Africa*, p. 43.
- ⁸⁹ Gary Minkley, "Corpses behind Screens," in Judin and Vladislavić eds, *Blank: Architecture, Apartheid and After*. D11.
- ⁹⁰ Jonathan Crush, "Migrations Past," in McDonald ed, *On Borders*, p. 13.
- ⁹¹ Cited in Mark Laffey, "Adding an Asian Strand," in Weldes ed, *Cultures of Insecurity*, p. 234.
- ⁹² Grundy's pioneering work *Confrontation and Accommodation in Southern Africa* is "interested in the impact of these... [migrant]..patterns on regional international relations", p. 67.
- ⁹³ The best study on this remains Lake, *The 'Tar Baby' Option*.
- ⁹⁴ Minnaar, "Ours for the Taking?" pp. 23-30.
- ⁹⁵ See for example First, *Black Gold*. See also the update in Centro de Estudos Africanos, *O mineiro*.
- ⁹⁶ For examples of this see Coplan, *In Time of Cannibals*.

⁹⁷ On this see, for example, Nkomo, *Migrant Labor Economic Theory and National Development Policy*; Whiteside, *Labour Migration in Southern Africa*.

⁹⁸ Harries, *Work, Culture, and Identity*, p. xv.

⁹⁹ Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*.